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During the early reconciliation negotiations between the city of Antwerp and Alexander 
Farnese in 1584, the city deputies thanked the Prince of Parma for his clemency. They 
claimed that this clemency was ‘the most recommendable virtue one could find, even among 
the greatest princes and monarchs’.1 Obviously the city diplomats pointed at Farnese’s 
leniency in warfare. However, it is striking that the phrasing was in terms of a general 
appraisal of the princely virtue of clemency. Not only contemporaries, but also Farnese’s 
biographer Léon Van der Essen pointed at the clemency of the Prince of Parma. He argued 
that Parma ‘knew how to make use of clemency in the interest of peace’. According to Van 
der Essen, Farnese’s leniency ‘was as effective to break the enemy alliance as his military 
interventions, for it incited most rebels to repel William of Orange and to reconcile with their 
King’.2  
References to the virtue of clemency occur abundantly in records relating to the Low 
Countries’ governorship of Alexander Farnese. Upon further consideration, this copious 
allusion to leniency is the result of Parma’s own deliberate attempt to act as a clement 
governor towards the Low Countries. In several printed letters to beleaguered cities, Farnese 
portrayed himself as the mediator of Philip’s royal clemency.3 In spite of the manslaughter in 
                                                 
1
 City of Antwerp to Alexander Farnese, Antwerp, 13 November 1584: Archives Générales du Royaume 
(Bruxelles), Papiers de l’État et de l’Audience (henceforth AGR Aud) 586 fol. 5-7, edited by L.P. Gachard in 
Bulletin de la Commission royale d’Histoire de Belgique (henceforth BCRH) série III, 12 (1871), pp. 193-198 
(nr. III), p. 195: ‘qu’ayant faict preuve, par-dessus les autres gouverneurs, ses prédécesseurs, de sa vertu et 
générosité au faict d’armes, elle nous offre si bénignement de la accompagner de douceur et de clémence, vertu 
certes la plus recommandable que l’on puisse trouver, mesmes aux plus grands princes et monarques’. 
2
 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, p. 6: ‘sachant faire usage de clémence dans l’intérêt de la paix. Cette clémence 
fut tout aussi efficace que la voie des armes pour rompre le front que lui opposèrent ses adversaires et, au 
moment psychologique, incita la plupart des rebelles à abandonner le Taciturne et à se reconcilier avec le Roi’. 
3
 Lettres de Monseigneur le Prince de Parme, .... Adressantes aux Bourgemaistres, Eschevins, etc. ... et habitans 
de la Ville de Bruxelles: Par lesquelles son Excellence leur presente la grace de sa Maiesté: moyennant leur 
reconciliation, 6 November 1580, Bergen, Rutger Velpius, -8°, 16 blz. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 547); Lettre 
envoyee par le Prince de Parme aux Bourgmaistres, Eschevins et Magistrat de la ville d’Anvers, ensemble et au 
grand conseil, dit, den Breeden Raedt, et aux Confreries d’icelle Avec la Responce desditz Srs Bourgmaistres..., 
13 November 1584, Antwerpen, Gillis vanden Rade, -4°, 16 blz. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 710, in Dutch nr. 711; 
other Dutch editions nr. 712 and nr. 713), also edited by L.P. Gachard, BCRH série III, 12 (1871), pp. 189-192 
(nr. CCCXIV). 
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the little town of Sichem and in the city of Maastricht4, the prince of Parma continuously 
underlined his balmy attitude and actions towards rebellious noblemen, soldiers, repentant 
heretics, cities, provinces and institutions.  
This paper reconsiders why and how Farnese referred to clemency. Alexander 
Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’, a careful combination of discourse and achievements, was 
both more and less original than suggested until now. It was less original than Van der Essen 
hinted5, as the reference to clemency was wide-spread in the sixteenth-century political 
thought and political decision-making. Since the start of the Dutch Revolt, the aptness of 
clemency as a strategy to pacify the uprising was highly debated. On the other hand, it was 
more original than Michel de Waele suggested while comparing the ‘methods of clemency’ of 
Alba and Farnese. According to this author, Farnese proved successful because he applied his 
clemency to the local and the personal level, thereby enhancing the personal contact between 
the vassals and their sovereign.6 However, Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’ had more 
distinctive features than its limited geographical scope.  
 
Clemency as a princely virtue in sixteenth-century political thought 
In Western history, the virtue of clemency never figured as prominently in philosophical, 
political or religious debate as the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, 
temperance) or the three theological virtues (faith, hope and charity). If all these virtues have 
been associated to Farnese’s personality, linking him with clemency reflects a sixteenth-
century fascination. Part of this interest related to the renewed popularity of Lucius Annaeus 
Seneca’s De Clementia, a treatise which had been virtually unknown during the high Middle 
Ages7 and influenced sixteenth-century political thought to a great extent.  
Seneca wrote this treatise for his pupil Nero as an incitement for the young emperor to 
be clement, in order to imitate the Gods and to be their true vice-regent.8 The text was a 
mixture between a mirror of princes, a moral treatise on a virtue and political propaganda for 
Nero’s reign. The philosopher aimed to illustrate how nature and ratio implied that clemency 
was specifically adept for kings.9 Seneca claimed that clemency assured a prince of a good 
                                                 
4
 Sack of Sichem: Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, chp. XII, pp. 223-233; Sack of Maastricht: Van der Essen 1933-
1937, III, chp. V, pp. 160-195. 
5
 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, p. 6.  
6
 De Waele 1996b, pp. 31-32; repeated in De Waele 2000, pp. 121-122. 
7
 Baraz 1998, p. 196. Interesting biographies of Seneca with special interest in his De Clementia: Griffin 1976 
and Veyne 2003. Most recent edition of the text: Malaspina 2002.  
8
 Fears 1975, pp. 486-496. 
9
 In fact, for Seneca it was conscious propaganda to use rex instead of princeps. Griffin 1976, p. 170. Meanwhile 
he challenged arguments against clemency which claimed that forgiveness supported the culpable and thus 
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reputation and of the true affection and love of his subjects. Leniency was not only a political 
guideline but also a rule of war: a military victory had to be handled with moderatio 
(moderation), in order not to harm the conquered people. In wartime, clemency towards the 
own soldiers prevented desertion. In the second book of De Clementia, Seneca narrowed the 
focus of clemency to the practice of a King as Judex.10 In the judicial sphere, clemency was 
both the ‘inclination of the mind to leniency in punishments’ as its result, the pardon or ‘the 
moderation that remits something from the punishment that is deserved and due’.11 Because 
clemency was necessary in politics, warfare and justice, Seneca developed his arguments 
referring to the moral, military and juridical jargon.12  
Still Seneca’s treatise was not a one-sided plea in favour of clemency: too much 
clemency could result in misericordia, which was not desirable for a stoic way of life. Too 
much clemency could also deteriorate the position of the King if his enemies exploited it as a 
sign of weakness. Furthermore, pardoning everybody was as cruel as refusing any pardon.13  
So Seneca set out a basic framework for associations to clemency in the sixteenth century: 
clemency was a princely virtue, closely associated to kingship and opposed to tyranny. 
Clemency could be vital in politics, warfare and justice: a clement attitude towards subjects 
and conquered people increased political stability, while clemency in punishing increased 
justice.  
However, De Clementia could never gain reputation in the sixteenth century without 
its hermeneutical relationship with changing realities.14 Renaissance revived the debate on the 
art of government (and adored the clementia Caesaris15) while the Reformation questioned 
                                                                                                                                                        
constituted a vice. The Old Stoic School had developed this kinds of arguments, so Seneca was venturing onto 
thin ice. Seneca, De Clementia, Book II, I, 1: ‘Esse autem aliquos scio, qui clementia pessimum quemque putent 
sustineri, quoniam nisi post crimen supervacua est et sola haec virtus inter innocentes cessat’. There is still 
discussion whether Seneca spoke out against other (or older) stoicists or not. Stoics based on Aristotle to define 
justice, in their view punishments couldn’t be remitted. In any case, Seneca moved away from this Aristotelian 
view in seeing the King as a Judge using clemency, basing on Roman jurisdiction. Griffin 1976, pp. 155-158. 
10
 Adam 1970 defended that Seneca’s treatise only hold a description of the ‘King as Princeps Judex’, but this 
statement was firmly attacked by Griffin 1976, 150. 
11
 ‘Inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda’ (De Clementia, liber II, 3.1); ‘clementiam esse 
moderationem aliquid ex merita ac debita poena remittentem’ (De Clementia, liber II, 3.2); the translations are 
from Griffin 1976, pp. 154-155. 
12
 Mortureux 1973, p. 17. However, he was somehow confused in the synonyms listed for clementia. In his first 
book misericordia, venia and ignoscere were synonyms for clemency where in the second book they are distinct. 
Griffin 1976, 152-154. In any case, for Seneca clemency could not be the opposite of the virtue of severity, 
because two virtues could not possibly contradict each other. Clemency avoided the cruelty of being too severe. 
Motto 2001, pp. 122-126. 
13
 Seneca, De Clementia, Book II, I, 2. 
14
 Solimano 1984, p. 399, De Waele 1996a, pp. 5-6. 
15
 Renaissance gave a new impetus to the discussion of the ‘art of government’ on the basis of ancient Greek and 
Roman texts. The direct contact with Antiquity revived old topoi like clemency: Renaissance adored Julius 
Caesar as a clement Emperor (for the Clementia Caesaris see Rochlitz 1993 and Lossau 1975). 
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forgiveness towards ‘heretics’.16 The enlarged importance of warfare17 also increased the 
importance of the ethics of leniency in a context where cruelty was predominant.18 This 
background made that after the editio princeps of De Clementia in 1475, other editions soon 
appeared in 1478, 1480, 1492, 1496, 1503.19 More importantly, influential thinkers as 
Desiderius Erasmus, John Calvin and Justus Lipsius edited the text.  
 For Desiderius Erasmus this edition was more a literary and philological exercise20, 
although in his Institutio principis christiani he insisted clemency was the virtue for which 
princes were mostly honoured21 and that sincere clemency could assure the affection of his 
subjects.22 Even if for Calvin the edition and a commentary on De Clementia was mainly an 
attempt to acquire recognition as a humanist, he chose this text to comment on the important 
theme of the character of the sovereign.23 Lipsius considered justice and clemency to be the 
two most important of all princely virtues and consequently he addressed a whole chapter of 
his Politica to the subject.24 The leading neostoicist even meant that De Clementia should be 
read by all rulers.25 Consequently, he commented the text at the Louvain university in 
presence of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella.26 However, when Lipsius was still in Leiden, 
Farnese’s ‘penchant for a strategy of clemency seems to have become a by-word among 
Lipsius’s close friends’.27 
 
Clemency in the sixteenth-century juridical and political discourse 
Sixteenth-century reflection on clemency evolved dialectically with the extensive 
development of the sovereign right to pardon, the concrete exponent of royal clemency. 
Although the praxis was based on Roman Law, the right to pardon only grew substantially 
                                                 
16
 For the discussion around leniency for heretics: Goosens 1996; De Schepper 1998, Vrolijk 2004, pp. 284ff., 
De Schepper 2005, Soen 2005. 
17
 Geoffrey Parkers so-called ‘military revolution’: Parker 1995, Parker 1996 (revised edition). 
18
 Baraz 1998, p. 189.  
19
 A survey on sixteenth-century editions of De Clementia can be found in: Calvin 1969, 74*.  
20
 Papy 2002, p. 10-36. 
21
 Erasmus 1974, p. 142 (206-208). 
22
 Erasmus 1974, p. 181 (481). 
23
 Calvin 1969, p. 74*. 
24
 Justus Lipsius 2004; Papy 2003, pp. 155-173; Waszink 1999, p. 248. 
25
 Papy 2002, p. 26, Marin 1988, pp. 119-126.  
26
 Lipsius even commented the text in presence of the archdukes Albert and Isabella: Van Houdt 1998, Grafton 
1991, pp. 9-10. 
27
  I owe this reference to James Tracy’s paper: ‘Tyranny, Turbae, and Auctoritas: Justus Lipsius as a 
Commentor on the Events of the Dutch Revolt, 1578 – 1591’, presented in Los Angeles, 7th of October 2005, 
citing following letter: Janus Dousa from London to Lipsius in Leiden, 6th November 1585, Letter 442:8-10 in, 
Nauwelaerts 1983, II, p. 237: although Dousa has not been able to write for four months, ‘tu lenior, qui amico 
manifesta in noxia haerenti de caussae dictione gratiam feceris, reoque ante preces necdem confitenti ignoveris, 
Parmae opino principis exemplo, cui novum imperium inchoanti utilis clementiae fama’. 
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during the late Middle Ages28 in order to acquire crucial importance in the context of state 
building in early modern times.29 A pardon re-established symbolically the loyalty between 
King and subject after a crime de lèse-majesté.30 According to the legal doctrine, a pardon 
was a one-dimensional act from King to vassal31, but law historians have proven that the 
development of the right of pardon responded to an existing demand of subjects to have 
juridical security.32 In the judicial sphere, ‘the other face of the struggle against violence’ was 
‘peace and order by clemency’.33  
 This right of pardon also intertwined with political thought and decision-making. In 
settling down conflicts with city authorities for example, the King used his right to pardon at 
city level, exploiting the images of Clement King and Forgiving Father. Maximilian of 
Austria partially solved the city rebellions in this way.34 Also Charles V paid considerable 
attention to this reputation as a Clement King after resolving the Comuneros or the Ghent 
revolt.35 ‘The other face of the struggle against rebellion’ was thus ‘peace and order by 
clemency’. 36   
Clemency was a demand of most ‘moderate’ counsellors searching for compromise.37 
Leniency could label all kind of aspirations in order to temper harsh repression of dissidents 
or rebels. But in this way, the debate was still focussed on the increase of royal authority 
while pacifying conflicts. In addition, clemency had a strong emotional connotation, as it was 
thought to increase the love between the subjects and their fatherly King.38 On the other hand, 
‘hawks’ defended the view that a military intervention could settle down conflicts in a quicker 
and more definite way, which certainly increased royal power. Hawks considered clemency to 
be dangerous: it could give a perception of weakness towards enemies. Only if justice was 
done, mercy was appropriate: compassion could not precede justice.39 
                                                 
28
 De Schepper and Cauchies 1997, Mertens de Wilmars and Rousseaux 1999, Vrolijk 1999, Vrolijk 2004, 
Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 
29Hoareau-Dodinau and Texier 1999, Texier 1999, pp. 14-16. Next to this attempt to reinforce royal authority, 
humanist jurists defended the use of pardon to express more human nuances in the jurisprudence. Viglius of 
Aytta, Head of the Secret Council, believed that every crime could be handled with mercy. Cited in Vrolijk and 
de Schepper 2004, p. 280. 
30
 Davis 1988, Gauvard 1984, Hoareau-Dodinau 1984.  
31
 De Waele 2002, p. 69. 
32
 De Schepper and Cauchies 1997, p. 268. 
33
 Title of Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 
34
 Boone 1999, p. 365. 
35
 Boone 2001, p. 47. 
36
 Paraphrasing Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 
37
 Louthan 1997, Woltjer 1976, pp. 229-321.  
38
 De Waele 1993, De Waele 1998. 
39
 Soen 2004, p. 323. 
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 But even if war was a (financially feasible) option, captains faced the same dilemma 
during sieges. Clemency towards conquered enemies could reduce revenge actions, but a firm 
treatment of the subjugated could make others surrender out of fear.40 In warfare, clemency 
was above all seen as a virtue for the victor towards the defeated: victoria was a precondition 
for clementia. Military victory easily swept away the argument that clemency could harm 
royal authority. The attitude of colonels during sieges was sometimes crucial for the overall 
politics. In 1585 Philip II advised Farnese not always to take into account the advice of 
military commanders, who normally opted for rigor. In politics, ‘mildness’ could produce 
more healthy effects.41  
 
 
The debate on clemency during the Dutch Revolt 
According to sixteenth-century political thought and practice, both in warfare and in politics, 
clemency could increase and decrease royal authority.42 If all political decision-making had to 
take stance in this impasse, Farnese had to face this dilemma in the particularly troubled times 
of the Dutch Revolt. Since the beginning of this Revolt, after the Compromise of the Nobles 
in 1565 and the iconoclastic fury in 1566, political decision-making struggled with the 
conception of clemency to reconcile rebellious vassals with the Crown. Several counsellors 
suggested clemency and pardon would avoid military conflicts and produce a symbolic 
reconciliation between the King and his vassals; as usual, others feared this would give a 
weak impression to the King.43 In the path of David Lagomarsino’s influential but 
unpublished PhD, some scholars have suggested that these political ideas related respectively 
to the affiliation with the factions of the prince of Eboli or of the duke of Alba at the royal 
Spanish Court.44 Nonetheless political opinions of most counsellors shifted then much more 
rapidly than their patronage networks. Also in the Low Countries the ‘loyalist opposition’ 
may have shared their ‘moderation’45, but they had very different views on the most desirable 
solution to the conflict and not all of them supported leniency. In any case, the discussions on 
clemency during the French Wars of Religion had more or less the same format between 
                                                 
40
 Parker 2002a, p. 146, Charles 1965, pp. 288-302, Waxman 1997, 339-340. 
41
 Philip II to Alexander Farnese, 7 March 1585: AGR Aud 193 fol. 23-25, Lefèvre 1940-1960, III, pp. 16-19 
(nr. 35).  
42
 De Waele 1996.  
43
 Soen 2004, pp. 309-328.  
44
 Lagomarsino 1974, Ezquerra Revilla 2001.   
45
 Janssens 1989, pp. 186-204.  
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supporters and opponents of clemency46, which suggests that the political debate can not fully 
be reduced to patronage or affiliations. 
 Margaret of Parma alternated moderation with repression in her attempt to pacify the 
growing discontentment.47 According to Woltjer, the ‘moderates’ obtained a victory until the 
iconoclastic fury discredited their solution. Afterwards, Margaret opted for a more rigorous 
policy towards dissidents.48 Under the pressure of the provincial governors and some 
members of the Council of State, she considered granting a general pardon, but until her 
resignation she kept on insisting on the validity of the counter-arguments.49 In Parker’s 
hypothetical model, her moderate policy could even have marked the end of the Dutch 
Revolt.50 
Alba’s repression made the plea for clemency even stronger. His Council of Troubles 
openly denied all access to royal clemency, most dramatically in the case of Egmont and 
Hornes. During warfare, Alba never really acted clemently towards the defeated. Although 
some towns received a mild city pardon, most of them were violently sacked in order to 
convince others to capitulate.51 His successor, don Luis de Requesens seemed to enter as a 
‘peace dove’, but he was more inclined to continue battles than to open peace negotiations.52 
This overall debate on clemency in politics and warfare was closely intertwined with 
the juridical implications of clemency: royal clemency needed to result in pardoning the 
rebels. After some minor settlements, Philip II allowed a general pardon for the Low 
Countries in 1570, 1572 and 1574 in the hope to pacify the conflict.53 These general pardons 
were laws based on the sovereign right to pardon. Anyone who was prepared to reconcile with 
the Catholic Church, could get remission of his crimes of heresy and lèse-majesté.54 However, 
the general pardon of 1570 and 1572 excluded traitors, leaders of the religious riots and 
reformed ministers, while in 1574 it was for some individuals intentionally forbidden to 
solicit a pardon. These general pardons failed for complex reasons, but a very substantial part 
of royal counsellors and loyalists in the Low Countries kept on believing in the potential of 
                                                 
46
 Christin, 1999, pp. 201-214. 
47
 Woltjer 1976, p. 300 and 306. 
48
 Woltjer 1976, p. 300. 
49
  Soen 2004, p. 322 and 328. 
50
 Parker 2002b, p. 270. 
51
 Soen (forthcoming), chapter III-VI, De Waele 1996, p. 32, De Waele 2002, p. 65.  
52
 Hortal Muñoz 2004, 78. I thank dr. J.E. Hortal Muñoz for making his PhD available to me. 
53
 Soen (forthcoming).  
54
 Soen 2005; for the theological G. Janssens , ‘Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium. The homily of 
François Richardot on the occasion of the solemn announcement of the General Pardon in the Netherlands 
(Antwerp, 16 July 1570)’, Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in 
Honour of Alastair Duke (forthcoming). My special thanks to prof. Gustaaf Janssens for making his manuscript 
available to me. 
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showing clemency, whether or not by means of granting pardon. This clemency strategy 
based on the recognition of royal authority differed of peace negotiations which implied to 
negotiate with the rebels on an equal basis.55  
 
Impetuses for clemency during Farnese’s governorship 
Farnese was confronted with the debate on clemency when arriving in the Low Countries to 
assist the military operations of his uncle Don Juan. Philip II repeatedly accused Don Juan of 
not acting with ‘enough clemency’ towards the flamencos. Of course, part of this accusation 
related to the intrigues of the secretary of State Antonio Pérez. But Philip and his counsellors 
also feared that the determined attitude and military actions of Don Juan would cause greater 
damage than taking a conciliatory attitude towards the States-General. Therefore Philip sent 
John of Noircarmes, baron of Selles to the Low Countries to act as a mediator between both 
parties. Again, one of the components of this peace mission consisted of granting pardon to 
anyone who was prepared to reconcile with the Catholic Church and the King.56  
Under pressure of the imminent arrival of Selles, Don Juan published a general pardon 
before attacking Gembloux, in order to accomplish the royal orders formally.57 Whoever 
surrendered without violence would be ‘embraced in clemency’. Don Juan described his and 
Farnese’s tactics as proceeding ‘con las armas en la una mano, y la clemencia de Vuestra 
Magestad en la otra publicandola y mostrandola con las óbras’.58 Parma praised his uncle for 
this strategically important move, which reinforced the victory at Gembloux.59 But soon after, 
the lieutenant Farnese opted for the inverse strategy. The violent attitude towards the garrison 
of the little town Sichem ensured the capitulation of Diest and Zoutleeuw (Léau), though it 
gave Farnese deep troubled feelings. Accordingly Farnese gave much more clement 
concessions to the capitulated garrison in Diest.60 Van der Essen saw this generous act as the 
                                                 
55
 De Schepper 2002, p. 327. 
56
 Soen (forthcoming in BCRH). 
57
 Verclaeringhe vande meynunghe des... Heeren Don Johan Van Oistenrycke... al voor ende eer te trecken over 
die Maeze ende te versuecken den wech van wapenen, Verweckende alle die ondersaeten om hun te bekeeren tot 
Godt ende Conincklycker Maiesteyt. Met een Ordinantie ende Reghel, hoe het volck van oirloghe syns 
Maiesteyts hun sullen houden ende reguleren...., Marche-en-Famenne, 25 January 1578, Luxembourg (Knuttel 
1890-1920, nr. 330). 
58Don Juan to Philip II, 7 February 1578: Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaria de Estado, Negociación de 
Flandes (henceforth AGS E) 576 f° 16: ‘y assi yremos el Principe y yo adelante con las armas en la una mano, y 
la clemencia de Vuestra Magestad en la otra publicandola y mostrandola con las óbras, como hasta aqui se ha 
procurado hazer’. See my forthcoming edition of this letter in BCRH. 
59
 Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 7 February 1578: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 221 (nr. 341); cf. Van der Essen 
1933-1937, I, p. 219. 
60
 Charles 1965, p. 298. 
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origin of Parma’s determination to pursue ‘une politique de clémence’.61 The experience with 
the manslaughter in Sichem can have been a trigger to Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’, 
though there were other more stringent reasons to act so. 
 The first one was that Philip II urged for clemency when he appointed Alexander 
Farnese as successor to Don Juan.62 Philip II insisted so much on clemency that the famous 
19th century state archivist Louis Prosper Gachard claimed that Philip II ‘turned into a mild 
and understanding King’ in the period of 1578-1581.63 This could be overlapping with 
Philip’s particularistic considerations during his stay in Portugal64, but it was also a reaction 
to the stubborn politic of Don Juan that had polarized the rebellion.  
When Cardinal Granvelle arrived in Spain in 1579, the plea for clemency was even 
reinforced at the Court. Since Alba’s governorship, Granvelle always called for moderation 
but he often presented this claim under the banner of royal clemency.65 His opinion was that 
the ‘humeurs’ of the ‘flamencos’ required a mild policy. Granvelle immediately supported 
Farnese’s moderation, hoping that he could pacify the conflict.66 Through the influence of 
Granvelle, Farnese’s policy had the support of the King and the Consejo Real, but later on, 
Parma’s connection with the Eboli-faction gradually turned against him at the Spanish 
Court.67 
Farnese’s main competitor for granting pardon was possibly his mother. The idea of 
sending Margaret of Parma in 1577 was conceived as a means to show clemency towards the 
Low Countries. Philip was prepared to delegate her the right to pardon so that she could act as 
a mediator between all parties. Margaret immediately announced this permission to pardon to 
her contacts in the Low Countries. Finally, Don Juan vetoed this plan by arguing clemency 
could not come before justice68 but he could not prevent the peace mission of Selles, who had 
the permission to promise pardon. When Margaret of Parma finally arrived in the Low 
Countries to replace her son, she still was seen as the peace dove who would embrace rebels 
                                                 
61
 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, pp. 234-238. 
62
 Instruction for Farnese, 13 October 1578: AGR Aud 1222/2 fol. 43. 
63
 Gachard 1852, p. 376: ‘tout à fait revenu de ses anciennes idées sur les Pays-Bas. Qu’il voulait les régir avec 
douceur, en respectant leurs privileges, en ayant égard à leurs voeux et à leurs besoins, enfin qu’il était 
franchement, sincèrement résolu à mettre en oubli le passé. Sur un seul point, celui du maintien exclusif de la 
religion catholique, ses déterminations étaient restées inébranlables’.  
64
 Parker 2002c, p. 25. 
65
 Van Durme 1953, pp. 276-280 and p. 292; For the preceeding period: Janssens 2005, pp. 135-156. 
66
 Van Durme 1953, p. 282. 
67
 Hortal Muñoz 2004, pp. 90-93. 
68
 Repetto Alvarez 1972 412-414, Soen (forthcoming BCRH); Margaret of Parma to Philip of Croÿ, 19 
November 1577: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 123 (nr. 203); Don Juan to Philip II, 30 November 1577: Lefèvre 
1940-1960, I, pp. 136-138 (nr. 219); Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 23 December 1577: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 
168 (nr. 267); Juan de Zuñiga to Margaret of Parma, 27 October 1579: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, pp. 702-703 (nr. 
1224). 
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with mercy and grant them pardon.69 Between Farnese and his mother, there are no letters 
conserved concerning the right of pardon, but it almost certainly caused additional tension in 
the already troublesome relation between them.70 
 However, not only royal guidelines inspired Farnese to adopt a clement attitude in 
politics and warfare. His closest collaborators supported mildness in line with their long ‘loyal 
opposition’ and ‘peace-making’, although most of them were staunch followers of Farnese’s 
military interventions. The political swift of the letrado and councillor of State Christopher 
d’Assonleville was exemplary for this evolution. In 1578 he believed in clemency and peace 
negotiations, because ‘weapons’ did not bring peace. However, already in 1579 he did not 
oppose to the siege of Maastricht.71 The loyal Peter-Ernst of Mansfelt had always been a 
‘soldier’ opting for military solutions; yet he also argued that the clement settlement with the 
Walloon provinces was too important to break.72 After the Treaty of Mons of September 
1579, two thirds of the members of the collateral councils were individuals who had 
experienced royal clemency by getting a pardon for their rebel past.73 They were keen on 
suggesting clemency for affiliated rebel noblemen or for cities in which their families had 
strongholds. 
 Even the political thought of the rebel side stressed the importance of clemency. 
Several pamphlets called for a ‘virtuous prince’ to replace the ‘Spanish Tyrant’. The 
pamphlets addressed to the duke of Anjou or even the duke of Leicester called for clemency.74 
Of course, this may have been the convention or a simple reaction to the harsh repression of 
Alba.  
 
Farnese’s ‘Method of Clemency’ 
Even if his ‘method of clemency’ consisted of an amalgam of different aspirations of the 
Spanish Court and the Dutch counsellors, Farnese still had a decisive role in this policy. His 
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lenient attitude may have been the result of his care for reputation75, but it was also an 
important political strategy which differed from Alba’s tactics. Farnese achieved this by 
intentionally exploiting the vocabulary and gestures associated with the virtue of clemency. 
Moreover he used his ‘method of clemency’ consistently at the political, juridical and military 
level, which none of his predecessors had done before. 
That did not imply that he was a peace dove. Farnese did not approve of the Cologne 
peace negotiations out of fear that they would prevent royal victories in war.76 He also made 
perfectly use of the arguments against clemency if Madrid clemency guidelines held the 
decision to diminish military expenses in the Low Countries. In a letter of the 2nd of July 1580 
for example, Farnese cried out his despair over Philip’s cut-down on the military budget for 
the Low Countries. Farnese used the arguments against clemency in the same way Alba had 
done77: the rebels had interpreted the royal clemency as signs of weakness and had radicalised 
their actions. So, Farnese argued, money and soldiers were necessary to win the war.78 But 
Farnese only adopted that discourse ‘behind the screens’.  
 
Use of the language of clemency 
The discourse of clemency served Farnese well to challenge two main conceptions of the 
rebel political thought. Since the governorship of Alba, the theme of the innate cruelty of the 
Spanish nation, rather than the myth of the Spanish Inquisition, was a recurrent theme in all 
pamphlets.79 But as clemency was the antonym of ‘cruelty’, Farnese’s discourse took distance 
of Alba’s repression. Moreover, because ‘clemency’ was an innate virtue of the ‘Good King’, 
Farnese tried to avoid identification with the rebel claim of ‘Spanish tyranny’. 
It is no surprise that Farnese mostly exploited the discourse of clemency in warfare. 
His successful military operations brought him great reputation and credibility which 
prevented that his clemency gave an impression of weakness towards enemies (although 
Farnese always remained concerned about this).80 Francesco Fiammelli appraised Alexander 
Farnese later on for his ‘moderate exploit of the victories’ and his ‘gran benignita’ towards 
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enemies81, although some Spanish advisors thought that his clemency in warfare had 
prevented a rapid overall Spanish victory.82 Probably the relationship between victoria and 
clementia dialectically increased in Farnese’s strategy. Especially after 1580, when it was 
clear that overall peace negotiations failed, Farnese developed propaganda about the 
reconciliation of cities with the King, in which the discourse of grace and pardon was 
predominant. So before attacking a (bigger) city, Parma invited it by published letters to 
surrender under conditions which showed royal clemency.83 After conquering a city, Farnese 
stressed again his clement attitude, mostly by referring to his renouncement to execute severe 
rules of war. In a letter to colonel Christoffel of Mondragon concerning the capitulation of 
Oudenaarde, Farnese argued that because of the fortifications of the city and their hypocrisy 
afterwards, he could have chosen for rigor. Instead, he wanted ‘once again’ to show royal 
clemency. Moreover, keeping cities intact was better for royal dignity and authority.84 On 
another occasion, he repeated this view to Philip II as well.85 Of course, this language of 
clemency during warfare could only have some effect if it matched similar deeds. According 
to the ‘laws of war’, Farnese mostly acted clemently.86  
 Also as captain-general, Farnese insisted on being clement towards all soldiers, 
whether or not belonging to the enemy camp. In settling down mutinies in the royal army, he 
referred to his mercy in explaining his verdicts.87 The capitulation acts for defeated companies 
referred to Farnese’s motivation to forsake rigidity (to show doulceur rather than force). For 
the most part, the soldiers could leave the city, sometimes even with luggage, ensigns and 
weapons, as in the following capitulation act for the Dendermonde garrison in August 1584:  
 
 ‘Son Altèze, ayant veu les articles proposez par le seigneur de Mortaigne, capitaines, 
officiers et soldatz estans en garnison en la ville de Denremonde, et après quelques 
communications verbales tenues d’une et d’aultre, désirant monstrer toute doulceur plustost 
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qu’employer sa force, est contente qu’ilz puissent sortir et se retirer librement la part que 
bon leur semblera, portans, quant à eulx seulement, espées et dagues’.88 
 
Of course, Farnese’s propaganda during warfare asked for a reaction of the rebel side. 
A pamphlet of May 1583 tried to denounce Farnese’s and Philip’s ‘soeticheit’ (sweetness, 
mildness). According to the pamphleteer, Philip tried to hide his own cruelty by invoking 
God’s mercy. Philip’s clemency was showing off, in reality the King was inclined to war. So 
the pamphleteer urged the people not to trust the clement words of Farnese.89 
  
In politics Farnese aimed at the same reputation of clemency. It is striking how the 
reconciliation treaties of conquered cities consciously refer to Farnese’s clemency as an 
exponent of Philip’s clemency. The wording of the Ypres reconciliation treaty of the 7th of 
April 1584 balances carefully between the wide-ranging royal clemency and the clemency of 
the governor Farnese.  
 
 ‘Sa Majesté… néantmoins préférant tousjours la clémence à rigueur, ne désire 
riens plus que de réduire son peuple en bon et seur repos. A raison de quoy Son Altèze, 
au nom de Sa Majesté, consent et accorde que tous offenses…. leur seront entièrement 
pardonnez.’ (…) ‘Si seront traictez avecq toute doulceur et clémence, comme Son Altèze 
a jusques ores usé, conforme à la volunté de Sa Majesté, envers tous ceulx qui se sont 
renduz à son obéyssance.’90 
 
The reconciliation treaty starts with the commonplace that Philip prefers ‘clemency above 
rigor’, and therefore Farnese pardons the Ypres citizens in name of his majesty. The text 
states further that Farnese will treat the citizens with mildness and clemency, just like he had 
always acted to whom returned in royal obedience, in accordance to royal willpower. Farnese 
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was turning the royal clemency into a kind of personal propaganda. Similar formulations are 
found in the reconciliation treaty of Diksmuide and Oudenaarde. 
 ‘Au regard de ceulx de la ville, est contente Sadicte Altèze oublier et pardonner, 
au nom de Sa Majesté, tout ce que jusques present s’est passé: promectant, en foy de 
prince, de non recercher ny souffrir este recherché aucun pour quelque cause passée que 
ce soit.’91 
 
‘Et quand ausdicts du magistrates, bourgeois, manans et inhabitans qui vouldront 
demeurer, Son Altèze leur pardonne généralement toutes les faultes et offences, quelles 
qu’elles puissent ester, sans que à l’advenir, à cause d’icelles, personne puist ester pour 
les choses passes recherché en corps ny en biens. Et seront d’ores en avant traictez par sa 
Majesté comme d’ung bon, clement et béning prince.’92 
 
Still, these reconciliation treaties were drafted by Farnese’s diplomats, letrados anxious to 
enhance the power of the governor-general. In the royal ratification of the reconciliation 
treaties, such as that of Courtrai, the balance shifted again towards the royal power, although 
there was some formal recognition for Farnese’s influence.: 
 ‘toutesfois veullans plustost user de nostre clémence accoustumée et préférer grace 
et miséricorde à rigeur de justice, nous avons, à grand, meur advis de conseil et par la 
deliberation de nostre très-chier et três-amé bon nepveur le prince de Parma et de Plaisance, 
lieutenant, gouverneur et capitaine général de noz pays de par deçà, pardonné, quicté et 
remiz, pardonnons, quictons et remettons généralement et particulièrment, par ces 
pr”sentes, au corps et communaulté de ladicte ville et chastèlenie de Courtray, bourgeois, 
manans et habitans d’icelle, de quelque sexe, qualité ou condition qu’ilz soient, tous les 
crimes, offences et excès dessus mentionnez, ensemble toutes peines corporelles, criminèles 
et excès dessus mentionnez, ensemble toutes peines corporelles, criminnèles et civiles 
èsquelles à cause de ce ilz sont tombez, les recevant en grace et restituant à leurs bons 
noms, fame et biens non confisquez (…)’.93 
 
The clemency propaganda of Farnese towards cities did not pass unnoticed. When Lieven 
Van der Schelden received the commission to orchestrate the Entry of Farnese in Ghent, he 
recycled the triumph arch used for the Entry of Anjou. Significantly, he changed the old 
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fronton into a figure of the clementia principis.94 The devise praised the royal clemency 
which tempered the ‘arts de la guerre’. The Entry never took place, as Farnese was again on 
the battlefield to coerce Antwerp. Nonetheless, the preserved aquarel of Lieven Van der 
Schelden show how the globe and the balance of Justice were prominent in the iconography 
of clemency (see figure). 
 
At the juridical level too, Farnese avoided acquiring a reputation for being repressive. Farnese 
faced the same situation as Alba, when he had to bring William of Hornes, lord of Hèze to 
trial. Hèze had joined again the ranks of the States-General after his reconciliation with the 
King and therefore, he had overtly committed an act of lèse-majesté. Farnese deliberate kept 
away from final verdicts in this case, so as not to damage his reputation as a clement 
governor. First he confined the case to the Council of Artois, before appointing to a special 
commission to make up the final verdict. The commission consisted of ‘naturels’ 
(‘Netherlanders’) in order to raise the acceptance of the death sentence, in order not to repeat 
the scenario of the Egmont and Hornes case. Alexander admitted to his father that he did not 
want to be associated to the death sentence of that important nobleman.95  
 
Use of the means of clemency: Pardon and ‘oubliance du passé’ 
Most of all, Parma increased his reputation as a clement governor by granting grace and 
pardon. After 1585, he even offended the Secret Council by usurping the right of pardon in 
his name. Alexander Farnese gave pardon at all levels, not hoping to pacify the conflict at 
once by a ‘general pardon’.96 This related to the overall political strategy for ‘une 
réconciliation particulière’97, but it is significant that Parma never issued a general pardon for 
the Low Countries.  
Granting pardon was to some extent a respond to an existing demand. In the political 
sphere, the pardon was never a top-down act but a negotiated event.98 For example, the 
Walloon provinces immediately inserted a clause of pardon in their draft for a reconciliation 
treaty stating ‘une oubliance perpétuelle des deux costez’.99 Parma’s envoys answered that the 
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governor had already spontaneously offered his pardon.100 Michel de Waele even argued that 
the reconciliation treaties of Farnese could be considered as ‘contrats de fidélité’, in which the 
reciprocal pardon was crucial.101 However, Farnese’s pardon was that of a victor and the city 
had to solicit it.102 The Ghent magistrate implored Farnese’s pardon in a poem which 
accompanied a ‘tableau vivant’ for the planned Entry: Le fort caillou sur le dur l'on ne brise/ 
Mais le posant sur le coussinet mol/ Frappant hardiment, il rompra le dol/ Voyla qui meult ce 
prince Haulte/ Qui se perdre dans ses dures furis/ Par la douceur doit les mettre à mépris.103 .  
 
All conquered cities received a full pardon for their rebel past.104 This view was not generally 
accepted by the King or the royal counsellors. Alexander Farnese asked the King for example 
to write letters to convince the rebel cities, but Philip sent letters with the word ‘réduction’. 
Farnese insisted on using the term of reconciliation in diplomacy.105 Nevertheless Farnese 
also used reduction as synonym for reconciliation106, but wisely enough never in the public 
sphere. 
Through the reconciliation treaty, the citizens enjoyed of a pardon on an individual 
level, without formal conditions. To quote the Ypres reconciliation treaty again: ‘All citizens 
are fully pardoned, without the possibility that they can be pursued later’.107 Also fugitives 
who returned had a very high chance to be accepted within the city walls. Those persons had 
to go through a procedure before the city magistrate and the governor, but their reconciliation 
letters prove that the governor was very keen on giving pardon.108 Besides the pardon, their 
crimes were forgotten because of oubliance du passé. This clause appears much more 
frequent than in similar documents by Alba, Requesens or Don Juan. It was an intentional 
move to forget the past and redefine collective memory towards a firm reconciliation.109  
Some reconciliation treaties for bigger cities as Bruges, Gent and Antwerp did not 
force immediate reconciliation with the Catholic Church of the citizens. That was a big 
difference with the pardons of Alba, Requesens and Don Juan which were not valid without a 
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prior explicit reconciliation with the parish priests.110 The periods for reconciliation with the 
Catholic Church were differently defined in each reconciliation treaty. This clause was not 
present in the first reconciliation treaties, but along the victories the importance increased. It 
certainly increased the acceptance of the city reconciliations. Nevertheless, those who 
reconciled individually (noblemen, clerics or returned fugitives) had to prove their ‘catholic 
faith’.111 Moreover, when Farnese felt that this ‘reconciliation clause’ was not necessary, he 
was delighted to leave it out.112 
 
Farnese pursued Don Juan’s politics of giving pardon to rebellious noblemen. Don Juan’s 
agents had reached the reconciliation of Valentin de Pardieu, lord of La Motte113 who was the 
first major rebel to reconcile with the King. His reconciliation with the King was in many 
views crucial, as he went on to persuade other nobles. Farnese ensured him he could promise 
royal grace (and a lot of material advantages) to all noblemen who returned into royal 
obedience.114 Noblemen who declared loyalty got a formal pardon letter, which symbolically 
reconciled them with their King, in addition to the material restitutions. The fact that serval 
noblemen wanted to influence both Farnese and Philip in the drafting of this letter, proves that 
it was very important.115  
The ‘reconciliations’ of noblemen with Philip II were mainly centred around the 
patronage networks of the Artois and Hainaut prominent noblemen. Remarkably until 1579 
there were also efforts to reconcile William of Orange during the peace negotiations in 
Cologne, promising again ‘pardon’.116 But already in 1572, Orange had become an 
‘irreconcilable opponent’ of the Spanish Crown, not only because of his political evolution 
but also because of the confiscations of his lands and the kidnapping of his son.117 Also the 
diplomats in Cologne feared that a reconciliation of Orange could bring financial problems, as 
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Spain was unable to pay for Orange’s debts.118 Soon afterwards, this reconciliation diplomacy 
towards Orange was abandoned in order to banish him, although Farnese was reluctant to 




Reassessing Farnese’s ‘Method of Clemency’ 
Farnese undoubtedly played a highly original role within the debate on clemency during the 
Dutch Revolt. First, Farnese carefully used the language and the means of clemency in order 
to display himself consciously as a clement captain-general and governor. Secondly, Farnese 
was conscious that his ‘method of clemency’ could only succeed if he used it consistently at 
the political, military and juridical level, which none of his predecessors had done before. His 
consistency of clement attitudes, especially after the defeat of the Cologne peace negotiations 
1579, increased his credibility and caused great worries in the rebellious camp. That is a 
reason why the States of Holland tried to denounce Farnese’s virtues as the behaviour of a 
Machiavellian prince.120  
 His military successes made him undoubtedly a representative of firm royal authority, 
which offered a precondition for a productive pardon. Victoria and clementia were 
dialectically intertwined in his political strategy. At the same time, as Michel de Waele 
noticed already, Farnese tried to pacify in a much more moderate way than his predecessors 
by opting for city and province pardons and personal pardons for nobles or clerics. Hence, he 
facilitated a personal contact with the sovereign. Accordingly, Farnese extended the simple 
use of a pardon to oubliance in order to redefine collective memory.  
 
History has strange rules for making or breaking one’s reputation. Fernando Alvarez de 
Toledo, Duke of Alba, and Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma were both governor-generals 
in the Low Countries during the Dutch Revolt. In order to pacify this uprising, both ordered 
cruel city sacks as well as clemency measures for rebels and heretics. But their similar deeds 
had highly different repercussions: times gone by, Alba turned into the incarnation of cruelty 
whereas Farnese became the personification of leniency and clemency (at least in the 
‘Southern Netherlands’). This different appraisal reflects not only their actual 
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accomplishments but also the way they thought about and referred to the virtue of clemency 
in their political discourses.  
 Alba dreaded the word ‘clemency’. In line with a widespread political commonplace, 
he feared that showing (too much) clemency would give the impression of weakness and 
therefore increase the audacity of his opponents. Moreover, he saw his task as governor to set 
severe examples before the King would return to the Netherlands and then show his royal 
clemency. Thus, only after trialling political opponents and after a military victory upon 
William of Orange, the Duke of Alba agreed to issue a ‘general pardon’ for heretics and 
rebels. In his view this general pardon was a temporary measure, having no implications on 
his political discourse.  
 On the other hand, Farnese deliberately used the reference to clemency in the military, 
juridical and political context. He shared the other existing common opinion that clemency, if 
shown appropriately, would increase the love of vassals towards their King. Thus all 
reconciliation negotiations between the prince of Parma and rebels thus explicitly mentioned 
the governor’s clemency. But these references to clemency did not imply that Farnese stayed 
away from military sieges, committing similar ‘cruel’ sacks as Alba. 
 Both governors thu had different opinions on clemency, both valid according to 
contemporary political and moral treatises. Their view on clemency not only influenced their 
deeds, but also the way they justified their actions. Farnese’s copious references to this virtue 
of clemency, and Alba’s conscious abstinence of it, certainly contributed to their reputation. 
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